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Reports
Cairo: February 2003
Introduction
Part one Part two
Part three
Part
four
The Effect of the Emergency Law on the
Human Rights Situation
In Egypt: 1992-2002
History
These laws appeared for
the first time in 1914 during World War I, during which time Egypt was
part of the Ottoman Empire.
During this period, legislation was the responsibility of the Waly
(one high-ranking authority as opposed to a group of popular
representatives), and this situation prevailed until the establishment
of the Council of Ministers (Majlis Al-Nozaar) in August 1878.
In 1878, a Sultan’s Decree was issued outlining ministerial
responsibilities. It was decreed that in order for legislation to
legally enter into force, the relevant or specialized minister would
authorize it.
Following the British occupation, the Council of Ministers and the
Khedive, in addition to the Consultation of Laws Council and the
Legislative Assembly were designated as the four legislative bodies.
The Legislative Assembly was established with the sole responsibility
of legislating. It met only once however prior to the outbreak of
World War I in 1914. On 19 April 1923 the Constitution was
issued, which gave legislative authority to the Representative Council
and the Shoyoukhs Council (religious leaders), in cooperation
with the King.
In the Constitution of 1923, Article 45 stated that whilst the King had
authority to issue martial laws, such laws were required to be
immediately presented to the parliament, which would decide on their
continuing application or abolition.
In the situation where martial laws were issued whilst Parliament was
not sitting, the Constitution provided for the convening of an
emergency session to immediately discuss the new laws at hand.
Article 155 of the same constitution prescribed that the suspension of
constitutional arrangements could only occur in circumstances of war.
Similarly, the new Martial Law (No 15 of 1923) provided the following
conditions on the use of martial law:
v
The right to issue martial law was based
on establishing threats to security and public order, including an
external enemy or because of internal strife;
v
The situation of securing the Egyptian
army and guaranteeing supply to the armies’ movements and army work
outside the kingdom of Egypt. In Law No 73 of 1948, the right
of issuing martial laws was provided for in the case of a defensive
war. Article 3 of Law 73 included many arrangements that the
government was permitted to make during the time of martial law, some
of which placed restrictions public freedoms and the rights of the
individual.
It is important to realize from the above-mentioned articles,
that the system of martial laws in
Egypt established in
the 1923 constitution limited martial law to times of military
necessity. This may be contrasted with the breadth of the current
emergency law (see discussion below) which utilizes exceptional law
for political rather than military objectives. Additionally, prior to
the 1952 revolution, the martial law did not authorize the use of
administrative detention.
On 22 October 1930, the Constitution of 1930 was issued. The
1930 Constitution retained the articles concerning martial laws, but
included amendments to the detriment of parliamentary institutions in
Egypt. The constitution eroded the separation of powers and gave the
courts power to suspend or prevent publications being issued.
The Constitution 1930 was abolished by royal Decree (No 67 of 1934)
and the 1923 Constitution was re-instituted by another decree in
1935. On 15 December 1952 following the July Revolution,
the Constitution of 1923 was abolished and a temporary Constitution
was established on 15 February 1953.
Article 8 of the 1953 Constitution provided that: “The leader
in the Council of the Leaders of the Revolution takes over the
sovereign authority duties especially the arrangements that he sees
are necessary for protecting the revolution and the system for
achieving its goals”.
The Current Emergency Law
The Constitution of 1958 empowered the President to announce a state of
emergency. At this time, the current Emergency Law (No 162 of 1958)
was introduced. The Emergency Law provided that a state of emergency
could be declared whenever public security or public order were
endangered, whether by the threat or actuality of war, internal
disturbances or by natural disasters. Whilst the previous Martial Law
(No 15 of 1923) limited the declaration of emergency to two
circumstances (invasion or internal disturbances), the new Emergency
law widened the scope for cases for which a state of emergency could
be declared.
The current Emergency Law grants the authorities extensive exceptional
jurisdictions. Upon a declaration of a state of emergency, Article 3
provides that the President may take “appropriate measures to maintain
security and public order” through imposing restrictions on
individuals’ freedom to meet, travel and reside in particular places.
Further, the Emergency Law provides for wide powers of arrest,
detention and search, regardless of the protective provisions in the
Criminal Procedures Code.
In this way, the Emergency Law violates a number of constitutional
guarantees such as personal freedom (Article 41), the sanctity of the
house (Article 42), freedom on residence and travel (Article 50) and
the freedom of association and gathering (Article 54). Additionally,
such restrictions violate the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) to which Egypt is a party. For example, the
right to personal freedom (Article 29), freedoms of residence and
transportation (Article 12) the sanctity of privacy (Article 17) and
the right to peaceful assembly (Article 21).
The Emergency Law also places severe restrictions on the freedom of
expression. Article 2 empowers the military ruler (or his
representative) to censor, seize confiscate and suspend the
publication of letters, newspapers, magazines and all other means of
expression. Furthermore, it permits the invasion of the private life
of citizens; this includes their letters and telephone calls; this
clearly violates the right to privacy contained in the Constitution
(Article 45) and the freedom of opinion and expression (Article 48).
The same power also breaches Articles 17 and 19 of the ICCPR.
Another concern is the role played by the Emergency Law in denying fair
standards to citizens in relation to arrest and trial. The Emergency
Law gives the Executive branch broad power to arrest and detain
suspects considered a “danger to security and public order” and those
who fail to comply with emergency law rules.
Further, the Emergency Law has authorized the creation of exceptional
courts to hear matters arising under emergency laws. Additionally,
military courts have been established by military decree. Exceptional
courts do not provide the same protections to individuals as would
ordinary courts. For example, the accused has no right of appeal; the
prosecutor has greater powers than in ordinary circumstances and the
Executive power plays an important role in ratifying judgments, in the
composition of the courts and in the distribution of jurisdiction.
The exceptional courts consist of the Summary State Security Court
(Emergency) and the High State Security Court (Emergency).
In relation to the Summary court, the President is empowered to order
that such a court be formed of a judge and two military officers. He
may also decide that the court be formed entirely of military
officers. In the High security court, the President may order that it
be formed of three counselors and two military officers.
Such interference by the Executive arm of government in the judiciary,
infringes constitutional and international guarantees regarding the
separation of powers (see Articles 165-173 Constitution and Article 14
of the ICCPR).
Emergency Law (Article 9) also provides the President with the authority
to delegate cases covered by general laws to the exceptional state
security courts. This denies individuals their right to fair trial
standards including the right to a hearing before an independent and
impartial judge (see Article 68 of the Constitution and Article 14
ICCPR).
Additionally, the administrative courts do not have the power to
invalidate or review laws related to the state of emergency. The
removal of such judicial review erodes the rule of law and an
important check on the accountability of the executive arm of
government.
Moreover, what is equally concerning, is the gradual blending of
emergency-type provisions into the ordinary legislative framework over
the past 20 years. For example, the People’s Assembly has made
amendments to a number of laws such as the Law No 95 of 1980, which
placed restrictions on political opposition groups, and the 1992 law
on combating terrorism which removed certain protections for the
accused from the Criminal Procedures Code.
Despite
the strong local and international pressure to end the state of
emergency in Egypt, the law remains intact. As pointed out by the UN
Committee Against Torture, the Emergency Law represents a major
obstacle in implementing international human rights principles in
Egypt.
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